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Abstract 
In this paper, I draw attention to the complexities and confusions in the shift in discourse and praxis 
from “culture industry” to “cultural industries” and then “creative industries.” I examine how this 
“creative turn” is fraught with challenges, highlighting seven issues in particular: (i) the difficulties in 
defining and scoping the creative industries; (ii) the challenges in measuring the economic benefits 
creative industries bring; (iii) the risk that creative industries neglect genuine creativity/culture; (iv) 
the utopianization of “creative labour”; (v) the risk of valorizing and promoting external expertise 
over local small- and medium-scale enterprises in the building of “creative industries”; (vi) the danger 
of overblown expectations for creative industries to serve innovation and the economy, as well as 
culture and social equity; and (vii) the fallacy that “creative cities” can be designed. I suggest that the 
move towards creative industries discourse represents a theoretical backslide, and raise the possibility 
that a return to “cultural industries” would be more beneficial for clarifying our theoretical 
understanding of the cultural sectors and the creative work that they do, as well as enabling better 
policymaking. 
 
Keywords: Cultural/creative industries, cultural/creative policy, creative cities, creative class, creative 
turn 
 
 
Introduction 
The creative industries have been hailed as a key driver of the new economy, with their promise of 
being a source of growth and wealth creation. Over the past two decades, creative industries discourse 
has dominated academic and policy discourse in many arenas, replacing earlier references to the 
cultural industries. Many governments have turned to the creative industries in their planning of 
economic strategy, while scholarly interest in this area has also intensified. Yet, amidst the rush to 
embrace the creative industries, critics have pointed to a host of complexities and problems associated 
with the concept that need first to be addressed—urgently—before policy makers hasten to implement 
creative industries policies. In the absence of conceptual clarity and careful research, a more cautious 
approach is warranted in policy arenas. 
In this paper, I trace the shift in discourse and praxis from “culture industry” to “cultural industries” 
and then “creative industries.” In the second section of this paper, I remind readers of the genesis of 
scholarly interpretations of “culture industry,” how this then became understood in the plural as 
“cultural industries,” and then shifted quite precipitously to “creative industries” following the 
discursive change in policy circles. In the third section of the paper, I examine how this “creative 
turn” is fraught with challenges, highlighting seven issues in particular: (i) the difficulties in defining 
and scoping the creative industries; (ii) the challenges in measuring the economic benefits creative 
industries bring; (iii) the risk that creative industries neglect genuine creativity/culture; (iv) the 
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utopianization of “creative labour”; (v) the risk of valorizing and promoting external expertise over 
local small- and medium-scale enterprises in the building of “creative industries”; (vi) the danger of 
overblown expectations for creative industries to serve innovation and the economy, as well as culture 
and social equity; and (vii) the fallacy that “creative cities” can be designed. Following this analysis 
of the challenges associated with the “creative turn,” I suggest in the fourth section of the paper that 
the move towards creative industries discourse represents a theoretical backslide, and raise the 
possibility that a return to “cultural industries” would be more beneficial for clarifying our theoretical 
understanding of the cultural sectors and the creative work that they do, as well as enabling better 
policymaking (fifth section). 
 
From “culture industry” to “cultural industries” to “creative industries” 
The term “culture industry” has its foundations in the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory with its 
background in Marxist ideology and critical social theory (Barker 2004a, 46). As is well known, the 
term is attributed to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, whose essay “The Culture Industry: 
Enlightenment as Mass Deception” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944) established the understanding of 
the culture industry as one in which the cultural commodities produced are standardized and exist for 
the benefit of achieving monetary gains for those in power (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944, 120–121). 
In fact, they claim that “culture now impresses the same stamp on everything” (Adorno and 
Horkheimer 1944, 120). Specific industries that Adorno and Horkheimer identify as being 
perpetrators of a standardized cultural commodity include the film, music and magazine sectors. In 
the face of public regulation, dependence on corporate funding/sponsorship and competition, these 
industries are engaged in a race to find the lowest common denominator of public appeal, and in the 
process, sacrifice talent, individuality and creativity (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944, 121). Aiming 
particularly at the commodification of popular culture, Adorno and Horkheimer attacked the products 
of the culture industry as artificial products fuelled by market demand and capitalistic aims (Witkin 
2003, 2). Further, Adorno felt that the easy consumption of the standardized and uniform products of 
the culture industry created a public that was in turn unquestioning, uncritical and similarly, 
standardized and uniform (Witkin 2003, 2). In other words, by the commodification of culture (which 
causes a standardization of its production and consumption) and by institutionalizing cultural 
production as an “industry,” culture becomes less of an individualized and unique form of 
representation, but rather a mass-produced commodity that perpetuates the status quo (Barker 2004b, 
3). Thus, the culture industry, rather than freeing oppression, serves to reinforce current ideologies, 
and may even stifle genuine creativity from flourishing. 
Adorno and Horkheimer's negative conception of the culture industry stemmed from their association 
of culture with art and human creativity, which is meant to reflect life, to critique social circumstances 
and to provide a means for society to aspire to a utopian way of life (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 24). With 
the commodification of culture, especially with the mass nature of popular culture, culture and art 
have failed to play a role in guiding society towards a utopian state. 
Later understandings of the culture industry similarly adopted Adorno's conceptions of which sectors 
made up the culture industry. In addition, there was recognition that the culture industry is also made 
up of institutions that are concerned with “the production of social meaning” (including for-profit, 
not-for-profit and government organizations). They aim to communicate a message to their audiences. 
Thus, the culture industry as understood from the late 1960s onwards, was viewed less 
pessimistically. Led by later thinkers such as Walter Benjamin (1969) and Bernard Miège (1989), the 
incorporation of culture within a capitalistic framework is viewed as a site of struggle and contestation 
(as opposed to Adorno and Horkheimer's pessimistic view of culture as being lost to capitalism). In 
fact, capitalism, with its injection of resources and technologies, may aid the further development and 
innovation of the creative process (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 25). At the same time, the singular term 
(culture industry) was converted to its plural form (cultural industries), in a bid to acknowledge the 
complexity and interconnectivity of the different sectors of cultural production, alongside with the 
uniqueness of each specific field (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 24). 
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The shift from “culture industry” to “cultural industries” has been followed by emergence of the 
concept of “creative industries,” which was led by a policy shift from cultural to creative industries. A 
key moment that heralded the age of the creative industries occurred in 1997 when the UK 
government coined the term “creative industries” as a classifier for one of its main policy sectors, 
replacing the previously-used notion of “cultural industries” (Mommaas 2009, 51; O'Connor 2011, 
38). This change reflected the broadening scope of cultural industries policies and allowed room for a 
new creative industries agenda to differ from existing cultural industries policies. For example, the 
creative industries were defined to include the entertainment and leisure business, a segment not 
previously considered part of the cultural industries. The 1990s and 2000s witnessed heightened 
interest in the creative industries as an urban regeneration strategy, with creativity more purposefully 
integrated into economic and social policies, and the intensified commodification of artistic and 
creative activity. The creative industries were strongly promoted for their benefits to the economy, as 
supported by growing revenue and employment figures in the case of the UK (Banks and O'Connor 
2009, 365). Given their apparent success, UK policymakers were able to promote the idea of the 
creative industries to other nations (Cunningham 2003). Across the Asia Pacific, the creative 
industries began to feature in national and city policy agendas, as evident in places such as Singapore, 
China, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, India and the Philippines (Tschang 2009, 30; 
Kong and O'Connor 2009, 1; Banks and O'Connor 2009, 365). 
The policy shift from the cultural industries to the creative industries was accompanied by a 
corresponding discursive shift in academic writings—from “cultural economy” to “creative 
economy,” from “cultural clusters” to “creative clusters,” from “cultural worker” to “creative 
worker.” For example, “cultural economy,” referring to the investment in, and production, distribution 
and consumption of cultural goods and services, was overtaken by “creative economy,” with research 
focused on those industrial components of the economy in which creativity is an input, and content or 
intellectual property is the output (Potts and Cunningham 2008, 233). This explains the interest in four 
particular sectors, as identified by Howkins (2001)—the copyright, patent, trademark and design 
industries. Such a shift was accompanied by popularity gaining around the idea of the “creative city”: 
the annual number of citations of the term “creative cities” as recorded by Google Scholar rose 
significantly from 1990 to 2012, reflecting the growing amount of attention dedicated to the emerging 
concept (Scott 2013). A “creative city” offers an environment that enables people to think, plan and 
act with imagination in harnessing opportunities or addressing urban problems. It possesses the 
hardware of supporting infrastructure (high grade amenities such as museums, art galleries, concert 
halls, green spaces and other facilities that would attract creative talent to the city) and the software of 
a skilled, flexible and dynamic labour force (Landry 2008). Creative cities are typically characterized 
by aestheticized land use intensification, including the recycling of old building stock, and city 
branding that emphasizes the lifestyle, culture, heritage and other offerings by the city (Scott 2013). 
The promise of the creative city is so compelling that there are now more than 60 self-professed 
“creative cities” in the world, such as Bilbao, Darwin, Dubai, Hualien, Huddersfield, Milwaukee, 
Seattle, Sudbury, Taitung, Wuhan and Yokohoma (Scott 2013). Overall, the shift in emphasis towards 
the creative industries, creative economy and creative cities that has occurred over the last few 
decades reflects the overriding emphasis on creativity and its role in driving the economy. The 
centrality of “creativity” in the 2000s was noted by the geographer Jamie Peck when, in summarizing 
Richard Florida's The Rise of the Creative Class, observed that “[W]e have entered an age of 
creativity, comprehended as a new and distinctive phase of capitalist development, in which the 
driving forces of economic development are not simply technological and organizational, but human 
(Peck 2005, 742–743, emphasis in original). 
 
Problems with the “creative turn” 
The “creative turn,” with its shift in focus to the creative industries, creative economy, creative labour 
and developing creative cities, has been welcomed with enthusiasm by policymakers at municipal and 
national levels in many countries. Yet, there are serious and fundamental issues that need to be 
acknowledged and clarified. These are addressed below. 
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Defining and scoping the “creative industries”: ambiguities and opacities 
Agreeing on a universally-accepted definition of the “creative industries” is difficult due to the lack of 
consensus over which subsectors should be considered part of the creative industries. No international 
classification system exists for the creative industries. The term “creative industries” is therefore 
understood differently in various international contexts, and these definitions can vary widely due to 
the influence of local politics, histories and geographies (Banks and O'Connor 2009, 366). For 
example, in Europe, arts-related activities are considered to be the “core” creative industries, whereas 
fields such as advertising, design, architecture and the media industries are viewed as peripherally 
important parts of the creative industries (Throsby 2001; European Commission 2006; Work 
Foundation 2007). In contrast, definitions of the creative industries in Asia and Australia tend to be 
wider and may include industries such as online-gaming and even the wedding industry (Creative 
Asia 2013). The ongoing debate over how to define, measure and classify the creative industries 
remains (Banks and O'Connor 2009, 366), a debate that began even when the notion of creative 
industries was first broached (Cunningham 2009, 18). In particular, the classification of the creative 
industries by the United Kingdom's Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)1 has been 
questioned for its exclusion of sectors such as entertainment, heritage and tourism (Hesmondhalgh 
2007). 
Others have also argued that, based on the creative industries concept, additional sectors currently left 
out should, in fact, be included. The creative industries rely on creativity to produce creative products 
that can be used to generate intellectual property and economic benefits. Following this line of 
reasoning, there is little reason why the creative industries should include cultural activities, while 
excluding sectors in science, research and development (Howkins 2001; Jürisson 2007, 1). It is 
apparent that in much of the discourse and analysis of creative industries and creativity, the focus is 
on the purely cultural and aesthetic, but not scientific and technological (Scott 2013). Another issue is 
that creativity is not limited to those working in the so-called creative professions as every industry is 
thought to require creativity to thrive (Morgan and Ren 2012). Furthermore, creativity itself is an 
ambiguous concept with different conceptions of what constitutes creativity. This again contributes to 
the complexities of determining which industries should be included as part of the creative industries. 
Contending categorizations and definitions make it hard to gather accurate data about the creative 
industries (Cunningham 2009, 18), and leads us to the next problem of how to precisely measure the 
economic contribution of the “creative industries.” 
 
Estimating economic benefits: challenges and uncertainties 
Much of the enthusiasm for the creative industries in policy circles is fuelled by the belief that 
developing the creative industries will generate significant economic benefits and thus constitute a 
key driver of economic growth. At first glance, the data are impressive with the contribution of the 
creative industries to the economy reportedly high in many cases. A DCMS publication, for example, 
highlighted the impressive performance of the creative industries, in which economic output, 
employment and exports of the creative industries within Europe apparently exceeded that of car 
manufacturing and the chemical industries combined (Pratt 2008). Similarly, data collected by 
agencies in various countries indicate that the creative industries greatly boost revenue and jobs 
(European Commission 2006). In one report, the annual growth of the creative economy in OECD 
countries was cited as being several times more than that of the service industries as well as 
manufacturing (Howkins 2001, xvi). 
However, the data supporting the supposed economic benefits of the creative industries must be 
carefully interrogated. Statistics such as those reported above may be misleading due to definitions of 
the creative industries (Banks and O'Connor 2009). Because there is no consistent definition and 
classification of the creative industries, and confusion or disagreement over which subsectors should 
be included or excluded in the creative industries, it is difficult to gather accurate and comparable 
statistical data on the performance of creative industries over time and across economies. In fact, it 
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has been suggested that policymakers, who were already interested in implementing creative 
industries policy, were in a hurry to establish evidence to back up claims about the economic benefits 
of the creative industries (Banks and O'Connor 2009, 365), and contributed to the selective inclusion 
of data in the reporting process, thus making the performance of the creative industries appear more 
positive than necessarily the case. For instance, critics have argued that including the software, 
computer gaming and electronic publishing industries in the DCMS's list of creative industries was 
done to inflate the size of the sector and make it appear more economically significant that it really 
was (Flew and Cunningham 2010, 114). 
In addition, some domains considered part of the creative industries are undergoing changes, such as 
the merging of computer, cultural and content industries, in a continuing dynamic that presents further 
challenges to measuring the exact value of the creative industries to the economy. Another 
complication arises when new industry sectors that qualify as creative industries emerge, but are not 
added to the existing creative industries classification in time. This means data on the creative 
industries may not be up-to-date and completely accurate. Attempting to measure the output of the 
creative industries is also complex due to the nature and form of creative output. Creative output is 
more likely to take the form of creative services than physical products. Because services are more 
intangible than physical products, collecting accurate data on the number and value of the delivery of 
creative industries services, such as digital media, is thus difficult (Cunningham 2009, 18). 
Given the potential for numerous inaccuracies and incompatibilities, there is no conclusive answer as 
to whether the value of the creative industries is overstated or understated. The fact remains that 
statistics indicating the economic contribution of the creative industries may not be reliable, and 
gathering accurate data on the size, growth and output of the creative industries continues to be a 
challenge (Cunningham 2009, 19). 
 
Nurturing culture and creativity: inattention and neglect 
The important nexus between art/culture and economy is longstanding, and by no means a recent 
development nor a novel inclusion on the social science agenda. As Harvey pointed out in his 
foreword to Zukin's (1988) Loft Living, the artist, as one “representative” of the cultural class, has 
always shared a position in the market system, whether as artisans or as “cultural producers working 
to the command of hegemonic class interest.” Recognizing for the moment that cultural industries are 
part of or synonymous with the creative industries, the question arises as to why there should be any 
objection to the notion of the creative industries and its harnessing of creativity for economic 
benefits? Resistance to the idea of the creative industries stems from concern over the purely 
economic rationale behind development of this sector. It is not so much uneasiness over the 
introduction of economic motivations in the production and consumption of arts and culture, for that 
has existed for a long time. Rather, it is how creative industries discourse tends to neglect culture and 
shift the focus to an exclusively economic agenda (Kong and O'Connor 2009). What is unacceptable 
to critics is that the framework, policy aims and measures of success are all based on economic 
analysis and economic terms. Culture and the arts are valued only because they are seen as drivers of 
economic growth. The shift from cultural to economic priorities consequently encourages the 
development of those kinds of cultural production that generate the largest economic benefits, rather 
than cultural returns (Banks and O'Connor 2009, 367–368). Culture therefore loses its importance 
because of the prevailing emphasis on economic goals. The intensified commodification of culture is 
another detrimental outcome of creative industries policy as governments attempt to mine the cultural 
sector for more profit-making opportunities (Hesmondhalgh 2007, 1). The commodification of culture 
involves turning cultural activities and goods into commodities to be “sold” or marketed for 
commercial benefits. For example, arts and cultural spaces may be built solely for the purpose of 
urban regeneration and the hope of encouraging economic growth. In effect, cultural goods are 
produced and designed for the consumption of local, national and international markets (Krätke 2011, 
130) to fulfil the goal of wealth creation. 
Concern over the commodification of culture for economic gains has arisen for good reason. The 
value of cultural activities and products lies in their originality, but their commercialization and mass 
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distribution causes them to lose the very qualities that make them unique and distinct. Once products 
of artistic creativity, they are now reduced to mass reproductions. The economic agenda therefore 
runs counter to creative endeavour, and puts pressure on the creative industries to develop products 
with the overriding intention of responding to commercial demand (Krätke 2011, 134). This economic 
impetus is detected in the original definition of the “creative industries” set by the United Kingdom's 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), which clearly takes a commercial orientation by 
prioritizing creativity and creative industries that can generate intellectual property for economic 
profit. Specifically, the definition states that creative industries are “those industries which have their 
origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation 
through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property” (DCMS 1998; Flew and Cunningham 
2010, 114). The emphasis on creativity and the creativity industries purely because of their role in 
generating intellectual property for economic benefits is worrying (Flew and Cunningham 2010, 114; 
Hesmondhalgh 2008), as focusing on intellectual property for economic benefits encourages a narrow 
focus on producing what is “new” and has commercial value. The danger is that culture is recognized 
not for its intrinsic value, but solely for its ability to generate economic benefits. This is a familiar 
critique that returns full circle to Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of “culture industry” and 
represents a theoretical backslide. Later conceptions of “cultural industries” by Benjamin and Miège 
had already moved beyond the notion of “culture industry.” As previously mentioned, these 
conceptions positioned culture within a capitalistic framework as a site of struggle and contestation. 
Capitalism was viewed more positively due to recognition of its ability to provide the necessary 
resources and technologies to drive development and innovation of the creative process. A more 
nuanced notion of the creative industries and its potential for cultural development is needed than a 
simple return to Adorno and Horkheimer's pessimistic belief that culture has been neglected in the 
face of capitalism (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 25). 
 
Utopianization of “creative labour”: over-valorization, under-provision 
The development of a workforce of “free” and creative workers is a key part of creative economy 
discourse, with the belief being that the creative economy enables a more flexible, multi-skilled and 
mobile workforce. Characteristics of creative labour point towards a workforce made up of largely 
self-employed individuals, typically freelancing for multiple employers simultaneously or working in 
semi-permanent work groups (Gollmitzer and Murray 2008, 3). They have been labelled 
“entreployees” (Pongratz and Voß 2003), or people with “portfolio careers” (Hesmondhalgh and 
Baker 2013). The cultivation of a free and creative workforce in line with the development of the 
creative industries is portrayed positively, with the associated flexibility perceived as aiding creativity 
(Gollmitzer and Murray 2008, 18). 
Critics recognize that the development of the concept of “creative labour” or “creative class” with its 
positive attributes has over-valorized and utopianized the work and life of creative workers. In reality, 
there are many difficult challenges that creative workers on flexible working arrangements encounter 
(Deuze 2006; Cunningham 2009; Banks and O'Connor 2009). Precarity of labour has become a key 
issue, with a significant portion of creative workers experiencing job insecurity, uncertainty and 
anxiety over the contingent nature of their work, and feelings of isolation (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 
2010). As temporary employment becomes the norm, the relationship between employer and 
employee weakens, as do the bonds between fellow employees. Fellow employees may not even have 
had the opportunity to meet one other because the nature of their work means they could be 
freelancers working from home (Rossiter 2003; McKercher and Mosco 2007; McRobbie 2005). The 
lack of a common workplace means such forms of creative labour do not have the opportunity to 
come together to interact and socialize. Greater autonomy and flexibility in the work of creative 
labourers also affects income stability. For instance, working on projects with different employers at 
the same time may make it difficult for creative workers to access job benefits such as corporate 
pension plans (Gollmitzer and Murray 2008, 18–19). Hence, the very freedom and autonomy that 
creative labour promises is a double-edged sword that can contribute to negative working conditions 
experienced by creative labour. 
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Given the working conditions for creative labour, there is need for careful consideration of the needs 
of this group of workers before wholly embracing the idea of the creative industries. Policies to 
improve the working conditions of creative workers are lacking, in part because of the utopian 
discourse about creative labour. To enable a better chance at policy intervention, there is value in 
reminding ourselves of the notion of “cultural workers,” a term that predated the celebrated “creative 
class,” and which more commonly connotes a “poor struggling artist.” In some ways, the theoretical 
middle-ground has to be formulated, recalibrating the utopian concept of “creative workers” from one 
of celebration to problematization, while reshaping the concept of “cultural workers” from one of 
dejection to one of possibilities. Only with greater conceptual clarity of what this group of workers 
experiences can there be more effective policy to harness their potential while improving their 
working conditions. 
 
Attracting big international players or developing local SMEs? 
While many city and/or national governments have formulated and administered policies to support 
the development of the creative industries, critics have justly asked if these creative industry policies 
serve big companies (and external expertise) or support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
(and local cultures). Detractors are critical of policies that favour the attraction of foreign established 
companies, particularly in what may be considered a misplaced effort to boost the creative industry 
locally. They argue that local SMEs then find it difficult to compete with the large foreign companies, 
at the expense of developing local cultures and idioms. They also argue that such large foreign 
companies also tend to be led and dominated by foreign expertise, leaving local creative workers 
contributing at lower levels of appointment, with no opportunity for leadership. Critics also argue that 
this dampens the wage levels of local creative workers. 
These criticisms find expression in the context of Singapore, and a closer look offers further insights 
into the issues. Creative industry polices in Singapore have been criticized as tending to favour 
external enterprise. In recent years, the Singapore government has welcomed the presence of more 
and more companies from abroad in the country—such as LucasFilm, Tecmo Koei, the International 
Federation of Interior Architects/Designers, MEC (a media agency), Electronic Arts and United 
International Pictures—which has put SMEs in a more vulnerable position. Such policies include 
assisting external media companies with their infrastructural set-up and manpower pool, as well as a 
reduced corporate tax rate on incremental income for foreign companies (EDB 2014). The inflow of 
international companies has brought about anxieties for SMEs that cannot compete on the same terms. 
Local workers are also worried about losing out on jobs as international companies bring their own 
workers at the senior level, while at the lower levels Singapore's “pro-business” strategy has allowed 
businesses access to cheaper foreign workers. This has forced Singaporeans to compete by raising 
their skill levels or lowering wage levels, most commonly the latter. (Parenthetically, this easy access 
to cheaper foreign workers has changed in the last year or so since a major pushback from the local 
population.) 
Another example where the international and local interests intersect in potentially negative ways is 
borne out in the case of Australia. O'Connor and Xin (2010, 125) argue that policy-makers in 
Australia have neglected to take into account local histories and cultural nuances in their designing of 
creative industry policies, choosing instead to import (successful) policies designed elsewhere. When 
developing a creative urban policy, foreign “experts” were brought in for consultation who paid little 
attention to the colonial, indigenous and migrant history of the state, and failed to recognize the 
significance of the mining industry in Western Australia (Brabazon 2012, 182). The celebrated 
speakers and consultants (some from academia) who work the circuits, visiting cities and giving 
advice as highly-paid consultants, sometimes after visiting the said city for a day or two, contribute to 
the inappropriate travel of policy. 
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Creativity for innovation and economy, or culture and social (e)quality? 
Whereas creative class/industry strategies have been lauded for their contribution to innovation and 
economic growth, they have also been criticized for their potential to worsen social and cultural 
inequalities. Peck (2007, 10) believes creative class strategies are not appropriate for reviving 
declining cities because they promote rather than challenge the existing neoliberal urban agenda, and 
are designed to “coexist” with urban socio-economic or socio-spatial problems rather than solve them. 
He argues that creativity strategies are not designed to address “entrenched problems like structural 
unemployment, residential inequality, working poverty, and racialized exclusion” (Peck 2007, 10). 
Instead, they contribute to widening the income gap and the emergence of a low-wage service 
underclass. They contribute to dispossession through gentrification. The result is a class of workers 
who struggle to find stable employment, affordable housing, and social support (Leslie and Rantisi 
2012, 466). Further, Parker (2008) argues that there are implicit gendered and racialized assumptions 
packed into Florida's “progressive” creative class thesis that reproduce socioeconomic inequalities 
and valorize “hegemonic masculinity” (Parker 2008, 202). Women, minorities, and households are 
largely obscured in the creative class dialogue as they are not considered the chief “sites of creativity” 
(Parker 2008, 210). Low-income individuals and families are even less visible. The ideal creative 
worker is rarely portrayed as a woman or mother, but rather an overworked individual, whose labour 
is not split between home and work (Parker 2008, 211). The cumulative effect of all these criticisms is 
a view that creativity-based strategies are problematic because that they “ignore social problems of 
segregation and poverty, and instead try to transform the image rather than the reality of the central 
city” (Peck 2007, 10). 
On the other hand, it may be argued that there are misplaced expectations and excessive pressures on 
the creative industries to address a host of economic issues, and deliver on social equality as well. 
Multiple goals beyond economic development have been heaped on urban policy to develop the 
creative industries, including social inclusion, development of social capital and community cultural 
programming (Foord 2008). The multiple expectations may be unrealistic. Further, there is, in fact, 
currently little evidence to support the claims that the creative industries can play a role in fostering 
social inclusion or enabling greater community participation (Oakley 2004, 71). What this could 
suggest is that creative industries need/should not be seen as the panacea of all ills. Rather, there is a 
need to rethink theory and policy, so that a separation is made between creativity for innovation and 
economy, and creativity for culture and social (e)quality. While it would be ideal for different goals to 
be achieved through one policy, there is need to recognize that this need not always be the case, nor is 
it realistically achievable. 
 
Creating “creative cities”: a fallacy? 
The desire to nurture creativity and benefit from its potential in industry has led to the use of “creative 
cities” as an urban planning concept, its fundamental goal being the construction of an environment 
where creativity would thrive and serve as an economic stimulus. While the concept of “creative 
cities” first emerged in the 1980s, it gained real momentum and popularity in the 2000s in part due to 
Richard Florida's writings, and has since become a global movement. Creative cities are understood as 
urban areas where creativity, knowledge and innovation flourish; aided by the presence of a critical 
mass of diverse peoples who, through sharing and interaction, spark creativity (Hospers and Pen 2008, 
259–264). 
Debate centres on the question of whether “creative cities” can be deliberately constructed. Florida 
believes that with the right formula, a creative city can indeed be constructed, and offers strategies 
that governments can implement to attract creative professionals (Long 2009, 212). Cities aspiring to 
become creative cities are advised to invest in developing an environment rich in cultural facilities 
and the kinds of amenities that will attract creative talent, such as green spaces, arts and music scenes 
and farmers' markets (Scott 2006, 11; Peck 2005, 745). They must also be welcoming of diversity and 
offer enhanced tolerance, for example, towards alternative lifestyles, in order to encourage creative 
individuals to congregate there (Scott 2006, 11). 
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Others, however, believe that “creative cities” cannot be designed and constructed through deliberate 
action. They argue that putting in place conditions such as those described above will not guarantee 
that creative individuals will be attracted, nor induce them to settle for the long-term. More 
importantly, creative cities do not result simply from the congregation of “creative” individuals, and 
certainly, a concentration of creative people alone is not enough to sustain creativity (Scott 2006). 
Furthermore, the spontaneous and unpredictable nature of creativity means that devising strategies to 
produce creativity to increase the competitiveness of a city is not practical. Local governments may be 
able to increase the probability of creative output by creating certain conditions and making 
investments, but even then, the outcome is not guaranteed (Hospers 2009, 373). In addition, as 
creativity is “relative and situational, not universal or independent,” policymakers must be aware that 
creative city policies have to be tailored to suit local conditions, instead of following a standard 
formula (Pratt 2011, 129). 
Doubts also persist over whether “creative cities” can stimulate economic growth as claimed. 
“Creative cities” are believed to be more competitive and instrumental in revitalizing socio-economic 
growth. Yet not all empirical evidence supports the touted benefits that creative cities are supposed to 
bring. Steven Malanga from the Manhattan Institute pointed out that cities in the United States with 
the best economic performance, based on statistics such as employment and rate of formation of high-
growth companies, were not creative cities such as San Francisco or New York, but places such as 
Memphis and Las Vegas, which had low-tax and policies conducive for business (Malanga 2004; 
Peck 2005, 755). Likewise, Kotkin and Siegel point out that economic growth has been shifting to 
suburban areas that do not match Florida's idea of trendy, liberal cities, such as Riverside, California 
and Rockland County, New York (Peck 2005, 756). Krätke also calls for a more critical look at the 
idea of “creative cities” and contends that economic development is not dependent on urban 
development projects that attempt to increase a city's attractiveness (Krätke 2010, 850). Rather, what 
truly matters and serves as a determining factor in attracting people to cities is that people will 
ultimately go to where the jobs are, irrespective of the kinds of amenities cities hold. Cities should 
therefore focus on supplying high-quality career opportunities rather than becoming a “cool” city, 
which means “growing the economic base; sharpening skills, connectivity and access to markets; 
ensuring local people can access new opportunities and improving key public services” (Nathan 2007, 
447). Education and skills development are other areas that should be supported as well (quoted in 
Sands and Reese 2008, 10). 
 
Towards clarifying theory 
The early shift in focus from cultural industries to creative industries in policy circles led to academic 
interest being directed in the same way. In turn, such academic attention further intensified and 
contributed to the spread of policy interest in the creative industries. Governments—sometimes 
municipal, other times, national—have embraced the concept with enthusiasm and actively 
implemented policies to support the creative industries, but many have overlooked the “dark side” of 
the creative industries and failed to discern the problems associated with them. 
A fundamental issue underlying these problems is that “creative industries” is in itself an 
insufficiently robust category. This has not been sufficiently acknowledged, intellectually or 
practically, and the implications of this lack of clarity and consistency have not been sufficiently 
addressed. 
As discussed earlier, there are many practical implications of this lack of clarity. Existing definitions 
of the creative industries often do not recognize creative work in industries beyond the cultural, 
aesthetic and affective, thereby excluding from consideration important sectors that generate creative 
output. Furthermore, the category “creative industries” is so broad as to confound analysis, covering a 
vast array of sectors and industries ranging from advertising, design, architecture, film, television, 
music, fashion, electronic publishing, software, online-gaming, arts and crafts, to the entertainment 
and leisure business. With such a diverse selection of sectors and industries under the creative 
industries, designing and implementing effective economic and social policy across all these sectors 
becomes either too non-targeted and too fragmented, or too blunted through using the same policy and 
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instrument for diverse sectors. Another problem with the lack of clarity surrounding the category 
“creative industries” is that it leads to the serious danger of misleading policy or at least impeding 
appropriate policy. Misleading growth data that exaggerate the economic value of the creative 
industries may prompt governments to design policies that divert resources and funds to initiatives 
that do not translate into the desired benefits. Policy-makers may blindly implement policies to 
encourage the attraction and cultivation of “creative workers” without simultaneously addressing the 
problems associated with creative labour discussed earlier, resulting in negative consequences. At the 
same time, policy efforts may be directed towards developing “creative clusters” without sufficient 
evidence that these initiatives will result in significant economic advantages. 
Intellectually, a challenge to the continuing usefulness of the concept of “creative industry” is that its 
evolution, usage and, especially, critiques of it, represent a theoretical backslide from the advances 
made by Benjamin and Miège. In particular, those who criticize its usage return to an old argument 
regarding the culture industry, suggesting that, through the creative industries, culture and creativity 
are lost to capitalism. Yet, Benjamin and Miège had already gone beyond this argument, recognizing 
that the injection of capitalism may bring resources and technologies that enhance the creative 
process. It would appear that, theoretically, working with the category of “creative industry” has not 
helped to advance a more useful formulation. At this juncture, I propose a return to “cultural 
industries,” and four ways in which more productive theorizing might be pursued. 
First, I urge a return to “cultural industries” for the following reasons. It places attention squarely on 
the cultural, aesthetic and affective industries that the concept actually deals with. It obviates 
questions about why scientific, research and development activities are not included, thus keeping the 
range of activities (already large) within a more coherent scope. Second, without the burden of 
reformulating a less problematic concept of “creative industries,” we might turn our attention to more 
productive theorizing. I offer four directions in this regard: concerning people, place, economy and 
creativity. 
With regards to people, relieved of the burden of unpicking what the “creative class,” “creative 
worker” or “creative labour” stands for, a deeper analysis might proceed in terms of understanding the 
dynamics of precarity, enabling a better understanding of the challenges that a flexible and mobile 
workforce would encounter. Comprehending the balance between freedom and precarity, and 
certainty and risk in the context of working arrangements, has the potential to lead to a breakthrough 
in understanding how, despite precarity and risk, cultural workers continue the work they do. What is 
the place of factors such as the lure of freedom and expression, and other pragmatic factors such as 
flexible work regimes and dire economic conditions. With regards to place, such re-theorization has 
gained ground in recent years, interrogating the logics of clusters and recognizing the distinctiveness 
of industrial, business and cultural clusters (see Kong 2009). Cultural work differs in many ways from 
industry and business, and the logics of externalities and trust, cooperation and tacit knowledge, are 
far less relevant than the logics of reputation, cost, and environment. With regards to economy, a 
closer understanding of the dynamics between big business and small local enterprise is needed. 
Beyond the complaints about big business—particularly multinational presences—snuffing out local 
practice or exploiting local workers, is there evidence of fostering local expertise and mutually 
beneficial collaborative activity? Closer analysis of business relationships and in-depth research on 
the place of local cultural workers in different types of cultural industry organizations will yield 
clearer insights into different business environments, the relationships that lead to success and those 
that do not, and the experience of the individual worker in the larger scheme of things. Finally, an 
opportunity for improved theorization of creativity presents itself in the study of “cultural industries.” 
Creativity is constantly advocated for its ability to produce new ideas and drive innovation, yet the 
nature of the creative process is not fully understood. To effectively harness creativity, more must 
therefore be done to explore the concept, including the sociality, neurology, and psychology of 
creativity. In this regard, interdisciplinary work promises to be productive, involving sociologists, 
psychologists, neuroscientists, and others. 
 
 
11 
 
Towards rethinking policy 
Just as theory urgently needs clarification and (re)formulation, careful rethinking and redesigning of 
policy is needed. I offer three interventions in rethinking cultural industry policy. First, to avoid 
simplistic and ineffective policy design, clarifying the focus is a major first step (Watson and Taylor 
2013). A rethink of policy needs to take into account the complex dimensions of creative production, 
and sharpen the focus. If we accept that “cultural industries” rather than “creative industries” 
constitutes a better, sharper focus theoretically, it follows that policies will have greater clarity and 
efficacy if directed at the former rather than the latter. This does not mean that there cannot be 
policies to pursue biomedical industries or infocomm industries, to name just two examples of other 
types of “creative industries.” Rather, they are better served when addressed separately, recognizing 
difference, and avoiding conflation through the categories we use. Even more fundamentally, it would 
be necessary to recognize the differences of individual sectors within the cultural industries, such as 
the arts, media, and design sectors and to understand the specific challenges they face, in order to 
tailor policies appropriate for these industries. Evaluating each industrial sector individually, instead 
of collectively under the category “creative industries” or even “cultural industries,” will enable 
policymakers to avoid the pitfall of conflating data and policy instruments. 
Second, there is a need for governments to be clear about policy intent, so that instruments and 
interventions serve with clearly specified intents. It is critical to recognize that it is difficult for the 
same policy and instrument to be a cultural and arts policy, and a social and economic policy all at the 
same time. There is no magic bullet. Too often, urban policies group multiple goals together, resulting 
in unfocused objectives and unrealized goals. 
Third, good policy needs to be clear whether it set out to achieve balance, or to accord privilege or 
protection to particular groups or goals. A lack of clarity and certainty often results in policies that 
seem (work) at odds with one another. I cite three examples. In the area of support for appropriate 
business models, clarity in policy objectives is critical: is a balanced approach of simultaneous 
support for large multinational/international companies and local, small and medium-sized enterprises 
preferred, or is the former to be privileged, or the latter to be protected? Is one approach adopted 
purposefully, or is there simply a blind spot that explains the absence or relative lack of attention to 
another? In the area of hardware (cultural infrastructures) and software (talent development, both 
cultural workers and local authorities that administer the arts and cultural sector), is the objective to 
finance the development of cultural hardware in the hope that the software will develop and evolve 
organically, or should there be efforts to evolve software before hardware investment is pursued? Can 
they be pursued simultaneously? Equally important in the approach to rethinking policy is the need to 
hold to a clear position about whether policies are to contribute to the protection of local history and 
culture, or whether policies treat cultural industries as a global currency that can be replicated 
wholesale across difference locales. In recent years, policy enacted in one location is often borrowed 
and subsequently implemented in numerous other locations, with little hindsight or deference to local 
nuances, histories and circumstances. Such “Xerox” policies (Pratt 2009) result in policies that are 
forced into the local context in a damaging or unrealistic manner (Kong 2000). Clarity about this from 
the start, and through the policy implementation chain, is an important condition for successful policy 
formulation and implementation, although unfortunately it is not often apparent. 
 
Conclusion 
Over some 70 years, from the 1940s to the early 2010s, academic interest has shifted from “culture 
industry” to “cultural industries” to “creative industries.” Whereas the notion of “culture industry” 
evolved into the concept of the “cultural industries” in acknowledgement of the complexity and 
uniqueness of different sectors of cultural production, the notion of “creative industries” emerged 
following policy rhetoric, with the same lack of clarity plaguing both academic and policy discourse. 
Associated with this “creative turn” is the emergence of related concepts such as the creative 
economy, creative clusters and creative city. This “creative turn” has proven problematic. In this 
paper, I have sought to highlight the diverse theoretical and practical challenges that the “creative 
turn” has wrought. I have also begun to suggest ways in which theory urgently needs to be clarified 
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and attention paid to theoretical questions other than the challenges related to using the concept of 
“creative industries.” I believe that more productive theoretical insight can be gained once the 
intellectual community is relieved from the burden of defining “creative industries,” distinguishing it 
from “cultural industries,” and straining over why certain industries that rely on creative endeavour 
are not embraced within the fold of creative industries. To free ourselves from this imbroglio, I 
propose that we return, fundamentally, to the concept of “cultural industries” as the appropriate 
category, and expend our intellectual energies interrogating, instead, the nature of cultural industries 
in these four dimensions—people (cultural workers), place (cultural spaces and places), economy 
(business models and relations), and creativity in cultural activities (mental, social, psychological 
activity). 
Apart from reformulation of theory and redirection of theorizing activity, I urge a rethinking of policy, 
informed by greater conceptual clarity and theoretical depth. To achieve effective policy formulation 
entails a fundamental unpacking of the category of “cultural industries.” It requires that policymakers 
address individual sectors within the broader category as distinct sectors with unique characteristics 
and needs, while appropriately recognizing commonality alongside distinction, and addressing such 
commonality and distinction through suitable policy instruments. Further, clarity of policies follows 
from clarity about policy objectives—weighing up the relative urgency of economic, social, and 
community objectives, and acknowledging with clarity that there is no “magic bullet.” Clarity about 
the relative balance of specific objectives will also go a long way in more effective policies—the 
balance between big international business and small local enterprise; the balance between hardware 
provision and software development; and the balance between plugging into global cultural currency 
and developing local cultural idioms, to name just three axes of tensions. 
Theory and policy are not usual bedfellows. Yet, it is with conceptual and theoretical clarity that 
better policy can be formulated. If this paper serves as an intervention that leads eventually to both 
these ends, it will have been worth the words. 
 
Notes 
1. Various industry subsectors are included, such as film, television, software, electronic 
publishing, arts and crafts, and music (Flew and Cunningham 2010, 114) but they appear to 
be a diverse mix with no clear connection between them. 
 
 
References  
Adorno, Theodor, and Max Horkheimer. 1944. “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass 
Deception.” In Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated byJohnCumming,120–167. NewYork: Seabury.  
 
Banks, Mark, and Justin O’Connor.2009.“Introduction: After the Creative Industries.” International 
Journal of Cultural Policy 15(4):365–373.  
 
Barker, Chris. 2004a. “Culture Industry.” In The Sage Dictionary of Cultural Studies, 46 –47. 
London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage.  
 
Barker, Chris. 2004b. “Adorno, Theodor (1903–1969).” In The Sage Dictionary of Cultural Studies, 
3. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage. 
 
Benjamin, Walter. 1969. Illuminations. New York: Shocken.  
Brabazon, Tara. 2012. “A Wide Open Road? The Strange Story of Creative Industries in Western 
Australia.” Creative Industries Journal 4 (2): 171– 193.  
 
Creative Asia. 2013. “Statistics and Definitions.” http://www.creativeasia.co.uk/cluster-evaluation/ 
statistics-and-definitions/  
 
13 
 
Cunningham, Stuart. 2003. “The Evolving Creative Industries.” http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/down 
load/pdf/10875750.pdf  
 
Cunningham, Stuart. 2009. “Creative Industries as a Globally Contestable Policy Field.” Chinese 
Journal of Communication 2 (1): 13–24.  
 
DCMS (Department of Culture, Media and Sport). 1998. Creative Industries Mapping Document. 
London: DCMS. http://webarchive.nationalar chives.gov.uk/20121204113822/http://www.cu 
lture.gov.uk/reference_library/publications/47 40.aspx  
 
Deuze, Mark. 2006. Media Work. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.  
 
EDB (Economic Development Board of Singapore). 2014. “Incentives for Businesses.” http://www. 
edb.gov.sg/content/edb/en/why-singapore/ready-to-invest/incentives-for-businesses.html.  
 
European Commission. 2006. “The Economy of Culture in Europe. Study prepared for European 
Commission.” http://ec.europa.eu/culture/library/studies/cultural-economy_en.pdf  
 
Flew, Terry, and Stuart Cunningham. 2010. “Creative Industries after the First Decade of Debate.” 
The Information Society: An International Journal 26 (2): 113–123.  
 
Foord, Jo. 2008.“Strategies for Creative Industries: An International Review.” Creative Industries 
Journal 1 (2): 91–113.  
 
Gollmitzer, Mirjam, and Catherine Murray. 2008. “From Economy to Ecology: A Policy Framework 
for Creative Labour.” In Report prepared for the Canadian Conference of the Arts,1 – 70. Burnaby, 
BC: Simon Fraser University.  
 
Hesmondhalgh, David. 2007. The Cultural Industries. 2nd ed. London: Sage.  
 
Hesmondhalgh, David. 2008. “Cultural and Creative Industries.” In The Sage Handbook of Cultural 
Analysis, edited by Tony Bennett and John Frow, 552–569. London: Sage.  
 
Hesmondhalgh, David. 2013. The Cultural Industries. 3rd Ed. London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
 
Hesmondhalgh, David, and Sarah Baker. 2010. “‘A Very Complicated Version of Freedom’: 
Conditions and Experiences of Creative Labour in Three Cultural Industries.” Poetics 38 (1): 4–20.  
 
Hesmondhalgh, David, and Sarah Baker. 2013. Creative Labour: Media Work in Three Cultural 
Industries. London: Routledge. 
 
Hospers, Gert-Jan. 2009. “What is The City but the People? Creative Cities beyond the Hype.” In 
Creative Urban Milieus: Historical Perspectives on Culture, Economy, and the City, edited by Martina  
 
Hessler and Clemens Zimmermann, 353–378. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Hospers, Gert-Jan, and Cess-Jan Pen. 2008. “A View on Creative Cities beyond the Hype." Creativity 
and Innovation Management 17 (4): 259–270.  
 
Howkins, John. 2001. The Creative Economy: How People Make Money from Ideas. London: Allen 
Lane.  
 
Jürisson, Veiko. 2007. “The Creative Economy and Offside in Cultural Policy: An Economies in 
Transition Perspective.” Paper presented at the VII Annual Conference of Estonian Social Sciences, 
Tartu, November 28–29.  
 
14 
 
Kong, Lily. 2000. “Cultural Policy in Singapore: Negotiating Economic and Socio-cultural Agendas.” 
Geoforum 31 (4): 409–424.  
 
Kong, Lily. 2009. “Beyond Networks and Relations: Towards Rethinking Creative Cluster Theory.” 
In Creative Economies, Creative Cities: Asian European Perspectives, edited by Lily Kong and Justin  
 
O’Connor, 61–75. Dordrecht: Springer.  
Kong, Lily, and Justin O’Connor. 2009. Creative Economies, Creative Cities: Asian-European 
perspective. Dordrecht: Springer.  
 
Krätke, Stefan. 2010. “‘Creative Cities’ and the Rise of the Dealer Class: A Critique of Richard 
Florida’s Approach to Urban Theory.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34 (4): 
835–53.  
 
Krätke, Stefan. 2011. The Creative Capital of Cities: Interactive Knowledge Creation and the 
Urbanization Economies of Innovation. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Landry, Charles. 2008. The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators. London: Routledge.  
 
Leslie, Deborah, and Norma M. Rantisi.2012. “TheRise of a New Knowledge/Creative Economy: 
Prospects and Challenges for Economic Development, Class Inequality and Work.” In The Wiley-
Blackwell Companion to Economic Geography, edited by Trevor J. Barnes, Jamie Peck and Eric 
Sheppard, 458–471. West Sussex, UK: Wiley.  
 
Long, Joshua. 2009. “Sustaining Creativity in the Creative Archetype: The Case of Austin, Texas.” 
Cities 26 (4): 210–219.  
 
Malanga, Steven. 2004. “The Curse of the Creative Class.” City Journal (Winter): 36–45.  
 
McKercher, Catherine, and Vincent Mosco. 2007. “Introduction: Theorizing Knowledge Labour and 
the Information Society.” In Knowledge Workers in the Information Society, edited by Catherine  
 
McKercher and Vincent Mosco, vii– xxiv. Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield.  
 
McRobbie, Angela. 2005. “Clubs to Companies.” In Creative Industries, edited by John Hartley, 375– 
391. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
 
Miège, Bernard. 1989. The Capitalization of Cultural Production. New York: International General.  
 
Mommaas, Hans. 2009. “Spaces of Culture and Economy: Mapping the Cultural-Creative Cluster 
Landscape.” In Creative Economies, Creative Cities: Asian-European Perspective, edited by Lily 
Kong and Justin O’ Connor, 45–59. Dordrecht: Springer.  
 
Morgan, George, and Xuefei Ren. 2012.“The Creative Underclass: Culture, Subculture, and Urban 
Renewal.” Journal of Urban Affairs 34: 127–130.  
 
Nathan, Max.2007. “The Wrong Stuff? Creative Class Theory and Economic Performance in UK 
Cities.” Canadian Journal of Regional Science 30 (3): 433–450.  
 
Oakley, Kate. 2004. “Not So Cool Britannia: The Role of the Creative Industries in Economic 
Development.” International Journal of Cultural Studies 7 (1): 67–77.  
 
O’Connor, Justin. 2011. “The Cultural and Creative Industries: A Critical History.” Ekonomiaz 78 
(3): 24–47  
 
15 
 
O’Connor, Justin, and Gu Xin. 2010. “Developing a Creative Cluster in a Postindustrial City: CIDS 
and Manchester.” The Information Society: An International Journal 26 (2): 124–136.  
 
Parker, Brenda. 2008. “Beyond the Class Act: Gender and Race in the ‘Creative City’ Discourse.” In 
Gender in an Urban World, edited by Judith. N. DeSena, 201–232. Research in Urban Sociology, 
Volume 9. Bradford, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.  
 
Peck, Jamie. 2005. “Struggling with the Creative Class.” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 29 (4): 740–770.  
 
Peck, Jamie. 2007. “The Creativity Fix.” Eurozine. http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2007-06-28-pe ck-
en.pdf.  
 
Pongratz, Hans J. and Günter Voß. 2003. “From Employee to ‘Entreployee’: Towards a ‘Self-
entrepreneurial’ Work Force?” Concepts and Transformation 8: 239–254.  
 
Potts, Jason, and Stuart Cunningham. 2008. “Four Models of the Creative Industries.” International 
Journal of Culture Policy 14 (3): 233–247.  
 
Pratt, Andy C. 2008. “Creative Cities.” Urban Design 106: 35. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20730/1/ 
Creative_cities_(LSERO).pdf  
 
Pratt, Andy C. 2009. “Policy Transfer and the Field of Cultural and Creative Industries: What Can Be 
Learned from Europe?” In Creative Economies, Creative Cities: Asian-European Perspectives, edited 
by Lily Kong and Justin O’ Connor, 9– 24. Dordrecht: Springer Press. 
 
Pratt, Andy C. 2011. “The Cultural Contradictions of the Creative City.” City, Culture and Society 2 
(3): 123–130.  
 
Rossiter, Ned. 2003. “Creative Labour and the Role of Intellectual Property.” Fibreculture 1. http:// 
journal.fibreculture.org/issue1/issue1_rossiter. html.  
 
Sands, Gary, and Laura A. Reese. 2008. “Cultivating the Creative Class: and What about Nanaimo?” 
Economic Development Quarterly 22 (1): 8–23.  
 
Scott, Allen J. 2006. “Creative Cities: Conceptual Issues and Policy Questions.” Journal of Urban 
Affairs 28 (1): 1–17.  
 
Scott, Allen J. 2013. “Regional Studies Association Annual Lecture.” Paper presented at AAG 2013, 
Beyond the Creative City: Cognitive-cultural Capitalism and the New Urbanism, Los Angeles, April 
9–13.  
 
Throsby, David. 2001. Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tschang, 
Ted. 2009. “Creative Industries across Cultural Borders: the Case of Video Games in Asia.” In 
Creative Economies, Creative Cities: Asian-European Perspective, edited by Lily Kong and Justin 
O’Connor, 25–42. Dordrecht: Springer.  
 
Watson, Allan, and Calvin Taylor. 2013. “Invisible Agents and Hidden Protagonists: Rethinking 
Creative Cities Policy.” European Planning Studies. DOI: 10.1080/09654313.2013.790586.  
 
Witkin, Robert W. 2003. Adorno on Popular Culture. London: Routledge. Work Foundation. 2007. 
Staying Ahead: The Economic Performance of the UK’s Creative Industries. London: Department for 
Culture Media and Sport.  
 
Zukin, Sharon.1988. Loft Living:Culture and Capital in Urban Change. London: Radius. 
16 
 
 
 
Author’s biography Lily Kong is Provost’s Chair Professor in the Department of Geography, National 
University of Singapore. She is a social-cultural geographer and her research interests include the 
study of religion, the understanding of identities, and cultural economy and policy. Her recent 
publications include Religion and Landscape: Place, Politics, and Piety (2012, with Peter Hopkins and 
Elizabeth Olsen) while her major forthcoming publication (2015, with C.-H. Ching and T.-L. Chou) is 
Arts, Culture and the Making of Global Cities: Constructing New Urban Landscapes in Asia. 
Contact e-mail address: lilykong@nus.edu.sg 
